Varieties of firm: complementarity and bounded diversity by Wood, Geoffrey et al.
Geoffrey Wood is a Professor and Associate Dean in the School of Management at the University of  Sheffield, and a 
Visiting Professor at Nelson Mandela University in South Africa.  Richard Croucher is a Professor and Director of 
Research at Middlesex University Business School in London. Chris Brewster is a Professor of HRM at Reading 
University in the UK. David Collings is a Lecturer in HRM at the National University of Ireland, Galway, Michael 
Brookes is a Senior Lecturer in Economics at Middlesex University Business School in London.  Any correspondence 
may be addressed to g.t.wood@sheffield.ac.uk. The authors are extremely grateful for the comments and suggestions of 
the anonymous referees. 
239 
 
©2009,  Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics  
  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 
  Vol. XLIII      No. 1         March 2009 
  DOI 10.2753/JEI0021-3624430111 
Varieties of Firm: Complementarity and Bounded Diversity 
 
Geoffrey Wood, Richard Croucher, Chris Brewster,  
David G. Collings and Michael Brookes 
 
 
 
Abstract:  This is a study of the nature of internal diversity within liberal and 
collaborative market economies. Based on large scale comparative survey data, we 
assess the extent to which specific clusters of practices are associated with specific 
varieties of capitalism. Given that recent literature has pointed to internal 
diversity within specific national contexts, we explore the nature of internal 
diversity within both liberal and collaborative market economies, and what 
makes each variety of capitalism distinct. We find that more than one cluster of 
practices is indeed likely to be encountered in a particular national context, but 
that this diversity was bounded: only a limited number of alternative paradigms 
are likely to emerge and persist.  The survey findings not only shed light on the 
nature of this internal diversity, but also reveal the fact that liberal and 
collaborative markets remain distinct, with the rights accruing to employees being 
more deeply embedded in a wide cross section of firms within the latter. 
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This is a study of the nature of internal diversity with liberal and collaborative market 
economies. Based on large scale comparative survey data, we assess the extent to 
which specific clusters of practices are associated with specific varieties of capitalism. 
Given that recent literature (Brewster, Wood and Brookes 2006; Crouch 2005; 
Crouch and Voelkzow 2004) has pointed to internal diversity within specific national 
contexts, we aim to explore the nature of internal diversity within both liberal and 
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collaborative market economies, and what makes each variety of capitalism distinct.  
More specifically, this paper aims to empirically establish the specific clusters of 
employment relations practices associated with the different varieties of capitalism, as 
well as examining the internal diversity within both liberal market economies (LMEs) 
and collaborative market economics (CMEs). 
Using the United Kingdom as an example of a liberal market economy, we 
compare key voice mechanisms there with those of a number of cooperative market 
economies. We then explore which employment relations practices are likely to be 
encountered together, and how they may form the building blocks of a number of 
alternative employment relations paradigms that may be encountered in different 
kinds of national economies. We suggest that specific clusters of corporate practice 
are discernible even within a LME context.  We therefore show that the number of 
clusters of practice is bounded, and not as diffuse as has been suggested (Deakin et al. 
2006).  The finding is significant since under these circumstances, state employment 
relations and training policies may be effectively targeted despite the paucity of 
intermediate institutions such as employers’ associations in LMEs (Culpepper 2003). 
 
National Variations in Practice: Path Dependence or Evolving Difference? 
 
A growing body of literature has sought to explain variations in employment relations 
practices in terms of historical and current national institutional frameworks. The 
Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature represents a firm-centered approach that seeks 
to understand what the firm does in terms of relationships with shareholders, with 
employees, with other firms through employers’ associations and informal links, and 
regarding corporate governance (Hall and Soskice 2001, 4-6).   The approach stresses 
the long-run robustness of institutional complementarities. Complementarity is 
defined as occurring when particular institutional features work better together than 
on their own, encouraging particular practices (Hall and Soskice 2001.).  A variant 
within this literature – the Business Systems approach – has tended to devote rather less 
attention to the mechanisms governing transactions between economic actors, and 
rather more to how individual actors emerge and control resources in different 
contexts, in terms of the specific relationships at work (Whitley 1999, 22).  The VOC 
literature suggests that firms seek to resolve the problems associated with coordinating 
these relationships in a number of alternative ways encouraged by different 
configurations of institutional support (Hall and Soskice 2001, 9). It is argued that 
there is a strong interdependence between the dominant forms of national systems of 
co-ordination and firms’ internal and external strategies and behaviors (Whitley 1999, 
24).  This will not only make for a certain uniformity in the manner in which 
relationships are acted out in different national contexts, but explains the persistence 
of a number of distinct alternative varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Whitley 1999).    
There are two broad approaches within this literature that make use of national 
ideal types. The first is the dichotomous CME-LME approach.  Dichotomous models 
(Appelbaum et al. 2000; Dore 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001) draw a distinction 
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between LMEs and CMEs. The former are distinguished by a shareholder driven model, 
where the generation of shareholder value is prioritized.  Relationships between firms 
center on short term contracting and adversarial competition with low levels of trust. 
Relationships between employees and management are distinguished by short-
termism, encompassing low levels of job security and investment in organization 
specific skills, and a weaker employee voice (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Dore 2000; Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Gospel and Pendleton 2003). In contrast, the stakeholder driven 
model found in CMEs is characterized by more patient stockholder behavior, alliance 
relationships between firms, and closer integration along supply chains. Employee 
relations are more long term, characterized by greater security of tenure, and stronger 
and more effective employee voice mechanisms.  The second approach proposes more 
variety.  Multi-variety models include the business systems theory of Richard Whitley 
(1999), and Bruno Amable’s more syncretic account (2003).  Whitley distinguishes 
between six types of business systems: fragmented, co-ordinated industrial district, 
compartmentalized (broadly comparable with LME), state organized, collaborative 
(broadly comparable with CME) and highly co-ordinated.  These are differentiated by 
three categories of variables: the nature of ownership co-ordination, the nature of 
non-ownership co-ordination and employment relations (composed of two variables: 
employer-employee interdependence and the degree of delegation to employees).  
Whitley (1999, 180) emphasizes the importance of pre-industrial socio-economic 
formations in shaping industrialization and the current position, both in the present 
and by implication the future.   Amable identifies five systems: the Anglo-Saxon 
Market model, a Continental European model, Asian capitalism, social democratic 
economies and a Mediterranean model.  Amable (2003, 265) also regards convergence 
toward a single model skeptically, arguing that institutional complementarities and 
socio-political compromises mean that change is likely to encounter serious 
opposition from employers as well as others.  Significantly, both of these models still 
propose the broad LME category; the greater range of alternative models of capitalism 
largely arises from drawing attention to the differences between different clusters of 
CMEs.   
Others have also argued that firms are the reflection of specific combinations of 
economic and extra-economic institutions and practices (Jessop 2001, x).  The latter 
include formal institutional traditions, shared values, networks, procedures, modes of 
calculation and formal laws (xi).   
The regulationist tradition argues that political ideologies and legal traditions 
form only part of a broader process of regulation, whereby institutions and associated 
conventions help secure – always on a temporarily and spatially specific basis – a 
certain stability and predictability within which economic activity may be conducted.  
Regulationists link changing workforce compositions and overall workforce sizes to 
changes in laws but also to shifts in informal rules governing both corporate 
governance and employment relations (Jessop 2001, xiii).   Laws, therefore represent 
only part of a wider regulatory framework – also encompassing informal and formal 
conventions – that through a process of formal policy formulation, experimentation 
and serendipity, results in certain complementarities. In short, within a specific 
 
242 
 
Wood, Croucher, Brewster, Collings and Brookes 
national economy, sets of practices are found to work better together than on their 
own. 
An important distinction between VOC and regulationist thinking is that the 
latter tradition sees systemic development on evolutionary and non-linear lines. Any 
period of growth is only temporary, and its cessation will result in a search for new 
forms of institutional mediation and complementarity through a process of 
development, recombination, rupture, and by core systemic features assuming 
alternative characteristics (Hollingsworth 2006).  Given that there are only a limited 
number of alternative sets of practices that are likely to be complementary within a 
given setting, this means that, even in lightly regulated LMEs, many firms are likely to 
have similar basic policies regarding employment relations.  However, regulationists 
would acknowledge that institutions operate at a range of levels – supra, national and 
sub-national – and that this may make for some commonalities in practice across 
trading blocs, and indeed on regional or industrial lines, making for internal variety 
within specific national settings (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997; Boyer 2006; 
Brewster, Wood and Brookes 2006).  Hence, they would question and qualify the 
VOC literature’s usage of national ideal types. In emphasizing that within individual 
national context more than one identifiable cluster of firm level practices is likely to 
be encountered, it is argued, institutions specific or relevant to regions and/or 
industries will make for spatial diversity (Hudson 2006).   This would reflect both 
regional and industry-specific historical legacies, and the effects of policy interventions 
operating at a range of levels.  Drawing on a number of different strands of 
institutional thinking, Colin Crouch and Helmut Voelzkow (2004,1) refer to such 
clusters as “local production systems,” or local economies dominated by a specific type 
of firm (e.g., small and medium enterprises (SMEs)) or economic activity.  This is 
owing to the fact that goods and services valuable to such types are likely to be 
encountered in specific areas (Crouch and Voelzkow 2004, 1). At the same time, 
individual local production systems are defined by internally common features and 
practices, making internal diversity in particular national contexts bounded, rather 
than diffused. 
If regional and industry-specific ways of doing things are likely to make for 
bounded diversity in specific national contexts, so is the process of change.  The VOC 
literature makes certain assumptions regarding path dependence.  The relationship 
between the organization of economic relations and production systems differs 
significantly between national contexts and these differences are likely to persist and 
even increase (Jacoby 2005). They represent the product of central institutions, legal 
frameworks, national training systems, union structures, and more diffuse norms and 
values regarding authority, loyalty and identity (Whitley 1999, 24-26). This does not 
rule out the possibility of systemic development, but assumes that it will be on a linear 
basis (Hollingsworth 2006). Indeed, Michael Brookes, Chris Brewster and Geoffrey 
Wood (2006) argue that the political economy underlying the VOC literature is more 
Durkheimian than Marxian. Alternatively, building on recent developments of 
regulationist thinking, Hollingsworth (2006) argues that national (and sub-national) 
contexts are subject to constant innovation and change, as well as continuity. Again, 
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this is likely to make for internal diversity, as innovations emerge and diffuse, and 
older systemic features become dormant, or confined to specific areas.   
A third maker of internal diversity concerns the nature of complementarity. 
Firstly, the VOC literature infers firm-level behaviors by examining national business 
systems or by reference to possible interactions between stylized institutional features 
and have, for that reason, been criticized as “functionalist” (Streeck 2005).  
Institutions may coexist without necessarily being fully complementary (Boyer 2006); 
in turn this may make for a greater degree of internal diversity than would otherwise 
be the case.  Indeed, where complementarities do exist, this may be to compensate for 
systemic weaknesses, rather than necessarily building on strengths (Crouch 2005); this 
will make for hybrid or “mixed” features within specific national contexts, again 
making for diversities in firm level practices.    Complementarities are likely to 
contain a myriad of different dimensions, not all in regular usage (Schneiberg 2007, 
52), again promoting internal diversity in specific national contexts.  Does this mean 
that national contexts will be diffusely or infinitely diverse, particularly in lightly 
regulated markets?   Mitigating against this is the fact that owing to limitations in 
technology, convention, and owing to the benefits accruing from familiarity, firm level 
practices are likely to be bounded (Marsden 1999); there are only a limited number of 
combinations of practices that are viable at any time (Boyer 2006).  In summary, 
internal diversity may be likely within specific national contexts owing to systemic 
evolution and change, regional and sectoral dynamics, and because of the nature of 
institutional complementarity and coexistence (c.f. Boyer 2006; Crouch 2005; 
Hudson 2006; Schneiberg 2007).  The existence and extent of diffuseness within 
specific contexts is clearly an issue for empirical testing. 
 
Method 
 
These issues are examined through the Cranet survey, the best data currently available 
on these issues across European countries. The survey focuses on a wide range of key 
areas of management practice, allows for employee relations factors to be placed in a 
broad company context, and provides the possibility of extensive international 
comparative work because it surveys across 39 countries. It is an international 
organizational-level survey of the most senior Human Resource (HR) manager in each 
organization.  Carried out at intervals since 1989 through an international academic 
network, it is conducted through a questionnaire, which in most national contexts is 
administered postally, although in a small number of countries it is administered, like 
the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) (see below), through face-to-
face interviews.  The survey is based on a sample drawn from governmental or 
commercial company databases depending on the country and stratified by the 
European Industry Categorization in NACE (Nomenclature Generale des Activités 
Economiques dans I`Union Europeénne). We use data from the 2004 survey.  
Further details are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Cranet Survey Details  
Feature Cranet 
Where key features and method 
of the survey are described 
Brewster and Hegewisch (1993); Tregaskis et al. (2004) 
Origin and iterations Started 1989, repeated 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995/6, 
1999/2000, 2004. 
Respondents Organization based full population survey. Most senior 
HR manager. 
Data gathering Postal questionnaire; administered face-to-face in some 
countries. 
Validation of results External, via management /union practitioner panel. 
Industry sample NACE European industry classifications. 
Nature of sample Public and private organizations.  Skewed to larger 
employers by numbers employed but  some smaller 
employers included.  In UK, 25.9% of sample had 100-250 
employees, 49.6% had 251-1,000 and 24.5% had 1000+ 
employees in 2004 survey.   Lowered threshold  to 100+ 
employees for some countries in 1995 but 200+ remains  
the threshold for most countries. 
Panel/non-panel Non-panel. 
Response rates Aggregated response rate for all countries involved 1989 = 
22%; 1999/2000: 15%. 
Areas of questioning HR function/corporate strategy/workforce composition/ 
flexible working/employee involvement and participation/ 
employee development/absence/ turnover/organizational 
performance/markets/ ownership/age of workplace. 
Strengths and distinctive 
questions 
Employee development including appraisal/ compensation 
and benefits including financial participation and also 
including (from 1999) questions on flexible working 
practices and “work-life balance” issues. Questions re: 
union influence on training and employers’ satisfaction 
with membership of employers’ associations introduced in 
2004/voice. 
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The 2004 survey contains responses from 8,216 establishments in 23 different 
countries. The core themes of the survey are HR departments and HR strategy, 
recruitment policies, pay and benefits, training and evaluation, contract and working 
hours flexibility, industrial relations and employee communication. In order to 
increase the level of comparability across the whole survey the questionnaires were 
translated into the respective home languages, in each case by a native speaker who 
was also a human resource management (HRM) specialist, this was to ensure that the 
HRM context of each question was not lost in translation. They were then back-
translated to check that they reflected the meanings intended by the network before 
being approved. The survey was carried out in the form of a postal questionnaire to be 
completed by the most senior HR person within the establishment. Since the nature 
of the survey presupposes that the organization has a dedicated HR/Personnel 
function, Cranet targets only organizations with 200+ employees. The sampling frame 
for each country seeks to ensure that the data is representative of industry sectors in 
the overall economy and is stratified in terms of employment by industrial sector. The 
8,216 responses received represented an overall response rate of 15%.   
We also use data from the 2004 WERS as a control on our results for the UK.  
These data are complementary to those from Cranet.  They refer solely to the UK, 
and include a higher proportion of smaller companies.  For further details on the 
survey method, see Kersley et al. (2006). WERS data differ from  Cranet data in that 
they are collected by face to face interviews and surveys with managers, employee 
representatives and employees. In addition it has a much wider coverage of the 
working population since the minimum organization size is only 5 employees. The 
most recent survey, 2004, includes data from 2,295 workplaces, a response rate of 
64%. 
As noted earlier, the overall purpose of the paper is to empirically establish the 
specific clusters of practices associated with the different varieties of capitalism, as well 
as examining the internal diversity within both LMEs and CMEs.  This must be 
derived from empirical observation.  Therefore, factor analysis is applied, a technique 
that attempts to represent a set of variables in terms of a smaller number of 
hypothetical variables. The basic assumption is that some underlying factors, smaller 
in number than the number of observed variables, are responsible for the covariation 
among those observed variables. 
In simple terms, factor analysis poses the question: how can we replace a large 
set of variables by a smaller set that best summarizes the larger set? Principal 
component analysis presents this problem in a mathematical sense so that we look to 
reduce p variables to a set of m linear functions of those variables that best summarize 
the original p, therefore implying that m principal factors can best summarize the 
original data. The attendant problem is that the number of principal components (m) 
cannot be known in advance, hence some form of acceptance criterion needs to be 
adopted. For this analysis the commonly used Kaiser’s rule which states that the 
number of principal components (m) is equal to the number of eigen values >1, is 
applied. The reasoning is that since an eigen value is the amount of variance 
explained by one more factor it makes little sense to add a factor that explains less 
variance than is contained in one variable. 
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Results from this type of analysis can be very difficult to interpret, since in many 
cases it is unclear which of the original variables relate to each factor. As a result, 
factor analysis is generally refined using a technique known as rotation. In simple 
terms this seeks to associate each original variable with one factor. In this analysis the 
commonly used Varimax rotation is applied, a technique that searches for a linear 
combination of the original factors so that the variance of the loadings is maximized, 
with the loadings being the correlations between the original variables and the 
components extracted by the process. 
 
Key Practices and Likely Correlations 
 
But, what are the defining features of practice in work and employment relations? 
Whitley (1999) argues that there are two key aspects defining the relationship between 
employers and employees: delegation and interdependence. The former can be 
defined as the extent of employee participation and involvement, and the latter as the 
relative security of tenure of employees, and the nature and extent of training and 
development (Whitley 1999).  It is recognized that participation and involvement 
represents a continuum, between limited consultation and more open ended 
participation. A key issue is whether the voice accorded to employees is direct or 
representative. Direct or individual voice is likely to be weak, as managers may more 
easily discount it, and, for fear of victimization, employees are likely to be unwilling to 
express unpopular views (Harcourt, Harcourt and Wood 2004; c.f. Hirschman 1970). 
Examples of direct voice would include a wide range of areas of employee 
involvement, including both team briefings and direct communication with 
management on a face to face basis, or via mechanisms such as surveys and 
suggestions boxes (Brewster et al. 2007b; Harcourt, Harcourt and Wood 2004; 
Dundon and Wilkinson 2006).   Stronger forms of employee participation would be 
representative: as employees are represented as a collective, their combined voice will 
be stronger, whilst individual employees are more likely to enjoy a greater protection 
from victimization (Harcourt, Harcourt and Wood 2004; Hirschman 1970).   
Brewster et al. (2007a) found that forms of representative participation are likely to be 
encountered together, i.e., works councils are more likely to be encountered in 
unionized workplaces. Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal (1999) argue that certain 
forms of direct participation may be similarly encountered together (c.f. Brewster et al. 
2007b).  Financial participation involving individual share ownership schemes may 
accord employees some additional rights, but they are likely to be very diluted and 
circumscribed; hence, financial participation should be seen as distinct from other 
forms of participation, and indeed, may, alongside a commitment to numerical 
flexibility constitute a component of hard HRM (c.f. Brewster et al. 2007b).  
Security of tenure may be most easily measured by the willingness of the firm to 
make use of redundancies: temporary contracts may simply represent a probationary 
tool for employees earmarked for secure employment, although having a large 
proportion of the workforce on temporary contracts may indicate a commitment to 
the long term use of insecure workers (Harcourt and Wood 2007; Harcourt, Roper 
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and Wood 2007).   The degree to which a firm is willing to invest in its people will be 
reflected in the relative priorities accorded to training and development; the use of 
external providers is a more complex measure and may either reflect weaknesses – and 
underinvestment – in internal organizational capacities, or active state involvement, as 
is the case in the flexicurity economies of Denmark and the Netherlands (Harcourt 
and Wood 2007; Bredgaardt, Larsen and Madsen 2005).  Harcourt and Wood (2007) 
argue that greater security of tenure is likely to be associated with a greater tendency 
for firms to invest in their human capital. Table 2 links these issues with key variables 
in the Cranet questionnaire, and highlights which practices are likely to be 
encountered together.   
It is worth noting that sets of practices 1 and 2 in Table 2 may well be 
encountered together, as both may be indicative of a more broadly cooperative 
paradigm or a lack thereof.  On the other hand, specific local conditions may drive a 
greater fragmentation in practices.  
Although factor analysis is essentially an exploratory technique rather than a 
scientific method for hypothesis testing, it reveals important correlations in practices, 
allowing us to interrogate the possible associations highlighted above and can generate 
a number of clear propositions for further testing.  As such, it provides a way of 
synthesizing – and comparing – large amounts of data, to assess what items are 
correlated in terms of underlying dimensions (Bailey 1982, 372).  Any exploratory 
work of this nature may result in scales emerging that are somewhat ad hoc and 
removed from the existing literature; however, they may, of course, come close to a 
previously derived scale, or be in line with what is already suggested by the existing 
literature, which would make the scale derived of theoretical value (Bailey 1982.).    
 
Internal Diversity 
 
Simply because certain practices are particularly common in national contexts, this 
does not necessarily mean that different firms may combine these different practices 
in similar ways, or that alternative paradigms may coexist with the dominant one. 
Table 3 represents the findings of a factor analysis of core sets of employment 
relations practices within a number of CME economies. The factor loadings are 
recorded for each variable in each factor, the factor loadings being the correlations 
between the original variables and the components that have been extracted.  
Therefore, in Table 3, the correlation coefficient between “Communication to 
management – direct to senior managers” and component 1 is 0.754. Following 
normal conventions those with a factor loading greater than 0.5 are accepted as being 
significant, for clarity the significant variables for each factor are in bold.  
A caveat is in order here: as Brewster, Wood and Brookes (2006) note, the 
presence of a strong national training system may free firms from extensive 
investment in formal skills and training, particularly at the point of entry, at the same 
time that high levels of job security may encourage employees informally to invest in 
job-specific skills and training, and other areas pertaining to human capital 
development throughout an employee’s career.  Temporary work may be used as a 
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Variables in Cranet Questionnaire Area Likely 
Association*
Decrease by Compulsory redundancies Interdependence 1 
% employees on fixed term or casual contracts Interdependence 2 
% of wage bill spent on training Interdependence 2 
% employees receiving external training Interdependence 2 
Financial participation through profit sharing, share 
options etc 
Delegation 1 
Downward communication through team briefings Delegation 4 
Communication to management - direct to senior 
managers 
Delegation 4 
Communication to management through immediate 
superior 
Delegation 4 
Communicate to management through regular 
workforce meetings 
Delegation 4 
Communicate to management through team briefings Delegation 4 
Communicate to management through suggestion 
schemes 
Delegation 4 
Communicate to management through attitude surveys Delegation 4 
Communication to management through TU reps Delegation 5 
Communicate to management through works council Delegation 5 
 
Table 2: Practices and Likely Associations 
*The same number indicates practices that are likely to be encountered together. 
 
 Sources: Harcourt, Harcourt and Wood 2004; Harcourt and Wood 2007; Brewster et al 
2007a and 2007b; Harcourt, Roper and Wood 2007; Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal 
1999. 
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screening mechanism in selecting employees for permanent positions, or simply as a 
means of limiting security of tenure (Harcourt, Roper and Wood 2006).   Again, 
where jobs are very insecure, high turnover rates are likely to force firms to invest 
heavily in basic induction training: high levels spent on training do not necessarily 
constitute good practice, but may be necessitated by hardline HR policies (Harcourt 
and Wood 2007).   
 However, what is not in doubt is that the volume of training, and the use of 
contingent workers is likely to vary from workplace to workplace, in line with other 
managerial strategies and the broader regulatory environment, will help define the 
specific variety of firm, and shed further light on the broader context. We found that 
different forms of direct voice in the form of communication mechanisms are likely to 
be correlated with each other, but are not necessarily correlated with representative 
voice (e.g., union presence, works councils).  This would echo the finding of Chris 
Brewster et al. (2007b), who highlighted both the distinct nature of collective and 
individual voice, and the extent to which they, whilst not mutually antagonistic, 
represent very distinct forms of practice (c.f. Harcourt, Harcourt and Wood 2004).   
Again, we found that different measures of training were correlated, as were 
redundancies and financial participation.  Redundancies and certain manifestations 
of financial participation could be indicative of a more instrumental approach to 
HRM (Gooderham et al. 1999).   
Table 4 presents a factor analysis of practices in the UK.  Once again, following 
normal conventions those with a factor loading greater than 0.5 are accepted as being 
significant. For clarity, the significant variables for each factor are in bold. 
Component one represents traditional forms of individual and collective employee 
voice, many having a formal or constitutional role; component two individual voice 
mechanism via an indirect mechanism; component three a reliance on external 
training purchased by the organization; and component four flexible or casual 
contracts and the use of forms of financial participation more commonly encountered 
in LMEs.  Component 5 deals with percentage of staff on casual contracts; the weak 
correlation with a union presence highlighting the tendency of many firms to make 
use of such contracts as a screening device in choosing long-term employees, when the 
latter enjoy relatively strong employment rights.  
The use of Works Councils/ Joint Consultative Committees (WCs/JCCs), or 
collective bargaining was only weakly negatively correlated with components three and 
four.  While the former are both relatively common in CMEs (Table 3), the fact that 
individual voice is not strongly positively (or negatively) associated with collective 
voice would suggest considerable internal diversity. It would seem that in CMEs 
various combinations of practices would exist, most commonly traditional collectivism 
(i.e., traditional collective voice mechanisms, but with a lack of attention being 
accorded to sophisticated individual voice mechanisms) and advanced cooperative 
paradigms (combining dominant collective voice mechanisms with one or other form 
of individual voice, and in some cases, a greater emphasis on training).  The fact that 
either of these paradigms may predominate in a particular national setting does not 
seem to have precluded alternative combinations of practices from emerging or 
Varieties of Firm: Complementarity and Bounded Diversity 
 
251 
 T
ab
le
 4
: C
ra
ne
t f
ac
to
r 
an
al
ys
is
 fo
r 
U
K
 fi
rm
s 
on
ly
, 5
58
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
* 
(R
ot
at
ed
 C
om
po
ne
nt
 M
at
rix
) 
 
* 
E
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
M
et
ho
d:
 P
ri
nc
ip
al
 C
om
po
ne
nt
 A
na
ly
si
s.
  R
ot
at
io
n 
M
et
ho
d:
 V
ar
im
ax
 w
ith
 K
ai
se
r 
N
or
m
al
iz
at
io
n 
 
C
om
po
ne
nt
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
D
ec
re
as
e 
by
 C
om
pu
ls
or
y 
re
du
nd
an
ci
es
 
.1
80
 
-.0
20
 
-.1
38
 
-.3
59
 
.5
54
 
%
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
on
 fi
xe
d 
te
rm
 o
r 
ca
su
al
 c
on
tr
ac
ts
 
.2
02
 
-.1
25
 
.0
24
 
-.0
04
 
-.7
10
 
%
 o
f w
ag
e 
bi
ll 
sp
en
t o
n 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 
-.1
14
 
.1
39
 
.1
58
 
.6
68
 
.0
96
 
%
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
re
ce
iv
in
g 
ex
te
rn
al
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 
.1
60
 
.1
01
 
.0
56
 
.5
81
 
-.1
40
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
pr
of
it
 s
ha
ri
ng
, s
ha
re
 o
pt
io
ns
 e
tc
 
.1
95
 
-.0
87
 
.2
87
 
.0
49
 
.6
25
 
D
ow
nw
ar
d 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
te
am
 b
ri
ef
in
gs
 
.8
38
 
.1
29
 
.0
77
 
.0
49
 
.0
17
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t -
 d
ir
ec
t t
o 
se
ni
or
 m
an
ag
er
s 
.1
04
 
.7
63
 
.0
55
 
.0
71
 
.0
12
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 im
m
ed
ia
te
 s
up
er
io
r 
.1
60
 
.7
86
 
.0
12
 
.0
39
 
.0
09
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 T
U
 r
ep
s 
-.2
33
 
.3
32
 
.3
09
 
-.4
01
 
-.2
62
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 w
or
ks
 c
ou
nc
il 
.0
29
 
.2
08
 
.2
18
 
-.4
93
 
.0
98
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 r
eg
ul
ar
 w
or
kf
or
ce
 m
ee
tin
gs
 
.3
48
 
.4
45
 
.1
04
 
-.0
76
 
.0
35
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 te
am
 b
ri
ef
in
gs
 
.8
08
 
.2
61
 
.0
93
 
.0
14
 
.0
42
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 s
ug
ge
st
io
n 
sc
he
m
es
 
-.0
09
 
.1
51
 
.7
37
 
.0
91
 
.1
10
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
e 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
hr
ou
gh
 a
tt
it
ud
e 
su
rv
ey
s 
.2
07
 
-.0
29
 
.7
61
 
-.0
47
 
-.0
37
 
 
252 
 
Wood, Croucher, Brewster, Collings and Brookes 
persisting.   In other words, it seems that a range of clusters of practices may coexist 
with traditional forms of collective voice, without being strongly negatively correlated, 
or necessarily complementary (in which case they would be more likely to be found 
together).  
Figure 1 summarizes the building blocks of practices in CMEs, and the extent to 
which they overlap. Roughly similar patterns are apparent in the UK  (Table 4).  
Figure 1:  Coexistence and Complementarity: The Building Blocks of Practice in 
CMEs  
Direct communication 
Indirect 
communication 
Redundancies 
Profit sharing 
Spend on 
training, use 
of external 
providers 
Voice 
via TU 
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While again, certain practices (e.g., financial participation and the compulsory 
usage of redundancies) are likely to be encountered together, there is no predominant 
paradigm emerging. It is likely that while traditional collective bargaining is less 
common, and the usage of redundancies more widespread, neither are more or less 
likely to occur when a range of individual voice mechanisms are present or absent.   
This would suggest that many firms practice hybrid combinations of practice that 
would loosely amount to hard HRM and more traditional forms of labor repression. 
Again – albeit less commonly than would be the case in CMEs – some may 
experiment with traditional collectivism and/or high value added production 
paradigms (c.f. Brewster, Wood and Brookes 2006). At the same time, the fact that 
correlations between different sets of practices are encountered at all would mitigate 
against arguments suggesting simple “diffuse diversity”: evidently, many firms are able 
to reap some complementarities by combining more than one set of practices.    These 
overlapping practices are summarized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Coexistence and Complementarity – Overlapping Practices in LMEs 
 
Direct 
communication: 
Briefings 
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Table 5 shows the results of a similar factor analysis carried out with WERS 
2004 data.  In general terms, it confirms our Cranet findings, though as is to be 
expected (since WERS contains a larger number of questions) the results are not 
identical, with factor loadings of greater than 0.5 being accepted as significant and 
highlighted in bold on the table. 
Moreover, differences may be encountered due to differences in sampling: the 
Cranet survey is focused on organizations and encompassed a larger proportion of 
larger firms, while the WERS survey is focused on workplaces and includes a larger 
number of  smaller units.  Nevertheless, certain types of practices are found together. 
For example, as per the Cranet findings, profit sharing schemes were correlated with 
the relatively recent use of redundancies.   The findings again highlighted the extent 
to which a union presence may coexist – rather than being negatively correlated – 
with a range of forms of non-union voice. A cluster of practices does not constitute a 
distinct exclusive employment relations paradigm, but provided that other practices 
are not negatively correlated, they may coexist: this does not mean that they 
necessarily work better together than on their own (i.e., complementary), but they do 
not seem to be dysfunctional to the other (i.e., one form of voice does not drive out 
the other). Both analyses therefore identify common building blocks in the form of 
associated sets of practices that are linked together by firms to create an overall 
employment relations strategy.  Thus, companies operating within the British LME 
select – either consciously or unconsciously from a range of packages of available 
options: this VOC appears not to exhibit indeterminate diffuseness. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results confirm that the firms making use of compulsory redundancies are likely 
to also make use of financial participation, such as share ownership schemes, that 
different forms of individual voice are likely to be encountered together, but that they 
are unlikely to be correlated (either positively or negatively) with collective voice 
mechanisms (c.f. Whitley 1999; Brewster et al. 2007a).  However, while Mark 
Harcourt and Geoffrey Wood (2007) suggest that training is likely to be correlated 
with a reduced willingness to make redundancies, this association was only weak. 
More broadly speaking, the findings generally supported the propositions advanced in 
Table 2.  These propositions deserve future testing in depth, and further exploring the 
nature of regional and sectoral dynamics. 
The Cranet survey confirms earlier findings that higher levels of information 
disclosure to employees by managers exist in unionized settings (Peccei et al. 2005), 
and that individual voice seems to coexist with, rather than displace collective voice.  
These findings are therefore not entirely novel, but they are based on a much more 
extensive international dataset than used by other researchers (see for example the 
datasets used by Wood and Fenton O’Creevy 2005 and Kessler, Undy and Heron 
2004) and therefore allow the association to be confirmed as a European one 
transcending “VOC.”  They are also based on more recently gathered data than those 
of Peccei et al. (2005). 
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Our results also point to the persistence of difference not only between, but also 
within national contexts, and the fact that certain employment relations practices 
remain very much more common in some places than others. The Cranet data 
highlights the persistence of key differences between liberal and comparative market 
economies, as well as the coexistence of alternative clusters of practices within both 
contexts. 
Hence, the paper indicates the nature of internal diversity within national 
settings, and the extent to which alternative clusters of practices may coexist.  The 
findings echo the idea of a relatively uneven, non-linear and contingent process as 
proposed by “historical institutionalists” as opposed to those of their more 
functionalist counterparts (Streeck 2005). This will result in spatially or industrially 
defined pockets of innovation (which may or may not diffuse across a system), and, in 
other areas, the persistence of institutional features that may have become redundant 
across the wider economy.     Internal diversity may also be driven by regional and 
sectoral specific institutional supports, representing the product of both specific 
historical legacies and endowments, and the effects of policy interventions at a range 
of levels (Hudson 2006). The results also underscore the complex and multi-facetted 
nature of institutional coexistence and complementarity, which is likely to further 
drive – but also confine – internal diversity within specific national contexts (c.f. 
Crouch 2005).  Finally, despite highlighting internal institutional diversity, the study 
also underscored the persistent differences between liberal and collaborative markets.    
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